


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The Handbook of Political Sociology
STATES, CIVIL SOCIETIES, AND
GLOBALIZATION

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CAMBRIDGE
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CHAPTER TWENTY-NINE

Globalization¹

Philip McMichael

Globalization is widely perceived as the defining issue of our times. Exactly what "globalization" means, however, is unclear. Some commentators argue that the world is not necessarily more integrated now than at the turn of the twentieth century (Hirst and Thompson, 1996), whereas others grant globalization only epiphenomenal significance in an era of transition to a postmodern world system future (Wallerstein, 2002:37). Positive definitions can take several forms, in which globalization is viewed as a process, an organizing principle, an outcome, a conjuncture, or a project. As a *process*, globalization is typically defined, in economic terms, as "the closer integration of the countries and peoples of the world . . . by the enormous reduction of costs of transportation and communication, and the breaking down of artificial barriers to the flows of goods, services, capital, knowledge, and (to a lesser extent) people across borders" (Stiglitz, 2002:9). As an *organizing principle*, it can be conceptualized as "deterritorialization" (Scholte, 2000:46), that is, as the *explanans* in accounting for contemporary social change, as "the 'lifting out' of social relations from local contexts of interaction and their restructuring across indefinite spans of time-space" (Giddens, 1990:21).² Related to this is the notion of glo-

balization as the compression of time/space (Harvey, 1989; Castells, 1996; Helleiner, 1997), expressed for example in biopolitical disciplines (Hoogvelt, 1997:125). And there is the political angle, emphasizing the global transformation of the conditions of democratic political community, as "effective power is shared and bartered by diverse forces and agencies at national, regional and international levels" (Held, 2000:399), challenging conventional, state-centered accounts of world order. As an *outcome*, globalization is usually understood as an inexorable phase of world development, in which transnational economic integration takes precedence over a state-centered world (e.g., Radice, 1998; Robinson, 2001).³ As a *conjuncture*, globalization has been viewed as an historically specific ordering of post-Bretton Woods international relations, structured by the "financialization" of strategies of capital accumulation associated with a posthegemonic world order (Arrighi, 1994), or as a form of corporate management of an unstable international financial system (Amin, 1997; Panitch, 1998; Sklair, 2001). And as a *project*, globalization has been viewed as an ideological justification of the deployment of neoliberal policies privileging corporate rights (Gill, 1992; Cox, 1992; McMichael, 2004).

Any attempt to define the term, especially in a handbook such as this, needs to be clear about

The author is grateful to Alicia Swords for background research on the MST and to Dia Mohan, Raj "Mel," the editors, and reviewers for comments on earlier drafts.

For an extended and incisive critique of this theoretical abstraction, see Rosenberg, 2000.

³ See Block, 2001; Goldfrank, 2001; and McMichael, 2001 for cautionary responses to Robinson's call for transcending a state-centered paradigm.

its orientation. The above distinctions represent emphases, which are not unrelated to one another, and concern how to represent current transformations. How to do that is the key question, perhaps underlining the directional and compositional indeterminacy of globalization, as a discursive reordering of the world. Globalization has such institutional force as a discourse that we need historical specification of why and how this is so. Problematizing contemporary globalization as a form of corporate rule helps to situate it historically and clarify its relational political dynamics. This requires two steps: first, understanding globalization as a *general* condition of the capitalist era (initiating world history) and *particularizing* its contemporary form;⁴ and second, demystifying globalization's phenomenal, or empirical, forms (e.g., economic integration measures) by examining it through its political counter-movements — as globalization's historical and relational barometer. Because globalization is realized at various scales (global, national, regional, subregional), it can be examined effectively through its multilayered processes, registered in movements that operate on different (but often interrelated) scales.

This chapter attempts to capture the contradictory relations of corporate globalization through an analysis of the movements that reveal its politics, rather than its broad and everyday trends. In order to demonstrate this fundamental property of corporate globalization, I draw on Karl Polanyi's (1957) exemplary account of the formation of the modern nation-state. In interpreting state formation through the prism of the double movement of political resistance to the institution of market relations, Polanyi provides a dual legacy. First, his method of distinguishing substantive from formal economics identifies the social dimension of such representations

of material relations. And second, Polanyi's use of this method to interpret the crisis of market rule at the turn of the twentieth century conceptualizes modern institutions as embedded in and ultimately subject to, political relations. In other words, the trajectory of an institution like the market is only comprehended through an interpretation of its cumulative social and political consequences. Beyond an economic process, market construction is a historical process of governing resistances to social transformation via conceptions of sovereignty and rights. This is also the case with corporate globalization, a successor episode of instituting market relations: on a world scale. Polanyi provides a link between the two episodes, not only historically but also methodologically, in his formulation of the "double movement" of instituting and resisting market relations.

The link between the formation of the European nation-state system and corporate globalization is that the latter emerges in opposition to the protective shell of the nation-state — what economists term "artificial barriers" to material flows across national borders. The ideology of corporate globalization champions "free" exchange, the logic of which is to reduce the historic frictions to global market relations in state regulations (sovereignty) and economic subsidies (rights). In this sense, corporate globalization represents a sustained challenge to the citizen state, rolling back the political and social gains of the counter-movements of the last century and a half (the "citizenship" bundle of economic, political, and social rights). The state itself is transformed, as an instrument of privatization, and its evident complicity in decomposing modern citizenship fuels an alternative politics, informing a global counter-movement.

THE GLOBAL COUNTERMOVEMENT⁵

This chapter argues that the global counter-movement both resembles and transcends in

⁴ Examples of the use of the method of historicizing forms of capitalist globalization include Arrighi and Silver et al.'s multifaceted analysis of a series of hegemonic/posthegemonic moments in the history of world capitalism (1999); Arrighi's "systemic cycles of accumulation" associated with Dutch, British and U.S. hegemony (1994); and analysis of U.S. hegemony as a resolution to the crisis of British hegemony (McMichael, 2000b).

⁵ I use the singular "counter-movement" to replicate Polanyi's usage, which portrayed the double movement as instituting and resisting market rule, across the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. As then, today

Polanyian double movement of implementation and resistance to economic liberalism. By emphasizing the discontinuity with Polanyi's double movement, I identify a distinctive dimension of the politics of the global countermovement, namely the rejection of the universalisms of the project of modernity, that is, the linking of the inevitability of progress to the necessity of science in the service of the industrial state.⁶ The World Social Forum (WSF) slogan of "another world is possible" challenges the neoliberal world vision, but from the perspective of strategic diversity. That is, another world would respect diversity, understood here as crystallizing through imperial relations constituted by asymmetrical forms of power and differential forms of exclusion (quite distinct from "development/underdevelopment" relations). This variation, expressed in ethnic, class, gender, racial, and sexual relations of inequality across the world, informs an overriding solidarity, as expressed in the WSF. The WSF unifies those

countermovement is quite heterogeneous — in political goals, identities, scales, tactics, etc. — nevertheless its multiple networks, organizations, and movements increasingly harbor a sensibility of connection (through strategic diversity) to a common world-historical condition, as is evident in the politics of the World Social Forum and as is noted by participating activist/analysts, for example: "Whether located in obscure third world cities or the centers of global commerce, the struggles of the Global Justice Movements increasingly intersect because they focus on virtually identical opponents: the agencies and representatives of neoliberal capitalism — global, regional, national and local" (Bond, 2001:7; see also Starr, 2000).

⁶ Although modernity is an unfinished project, it embodies the separations of nature and society and culture and society, reason, secularization, sovereignty, specialization, instrumental or functional rationality, a scientific imperative, bureaucratization, and so forth. Historically, these properties have come to define, or be identified with, industrial capitalism. Early modernity's idea of progress conceived of the possibility of domination of nature and the desirability of rational change versus traditional eternities and divine rights, but in the modernity of the age of high colonialism, progress as such became inevitable. Given the context, the project of modernity now became the imperative condition of the West and its colonial empire — all societies were to follow the path of urban-industrial capitalism governed by nation-states legitimated by popular sovereignty⁷ and universal legal codes (see Araghi and McMichael, 2004).

diverse resistances to global empire, articulated thus: "We are fighting against the hegemony of finance, the destruction of our cultures, the monopolization of knowledge, mass media and communication, the degradation of nature, and the destruction of the quality of life by transnational corporations and anti-democratic policies" (World Social Forum, 2001).

The global countermovement nurtures a paradigm shift.⁷ Transcending the politics of "underdevelopment," it draws attention to the choice facing the world's peoples: between a path of exclusion, monoculture, and corporate control or a path of inclusion, diversity, and democracy. Baldly put, this is a historic choice in two senses. First, the discourse of diversity confounds the universalisms of modernity, through which powerful states/cultures have sought to colonize the world with their singular vision. And second, the historic attempt to impose the logic and force of market rule on the world appears to be reaching its apogee. A protective movement is emerging, viewing markets not simply as objects of regulation but as institutions of corporate rule and espousing alternative social forms.

These alternative social forms draw on cultural and ecological traditions and radical interpretations of democratic politics. While embodying a vision of another world, these diverse social forms are strategic in sharing their rejection of neoliberalism. Whether the global countermovement adopts a political superstructure remains to be seen (Wallerstein, 2002:37).

⁷ David Held, although unprepared to view the nation-state as an institution of Western hegemony, considers this turning point as an indeterminate transformation of the question of sovereignty and rights: "globalization... has arguably served to reinforce the sense of the significance of identity and difference... One consequence of this is the elevation in many international forums of non-Western views of rights, authority and legitimacy. The meaning of some of the core concepts of the international system are subject to the deepest conflicts of interpretation, as illustrated at the UN World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna (June 1993)... If the global system is marked by significant change, this is perhaps best conceived less as an end of the era of the nation-state and more as a challenge to the era of 'hegemonic states' — a challenge which is as yet far from complete" (1995:94—5).

Ideally, a superstructure drawing on emergent WSF networks among grassroots movements, NGOs and unions, and respecting the principle of multiple overlapping jurisdictions (Cox, 1994; Held, 1995:137), would embody the distinctive cosmopolitan sensibilities of counter-movement politics. These sensibilities reflect its world-historical foundations and/or the growing prominence of transboundary issues, creating "overlapping communities of fate" where "the fortunes and prospects of individual political communities are increasingly bound together" (Held, 2000:400).

The connections among movements as diverse as labor, feminist, peasant, environmentalist, and indigenous organizations may not be immediate, but the power of the movements lies in shared circumstances and reflexive diversity. In this sense, corporate globalization has distinctive faces, places, and meanings, concretizing it as a complex, diverse, and contradictory unity conditioned by its multiplicity of resistances. This relationship is evident in the World Bank's tactical embrace of social capital and "voices of the poor" (Narayan, 2000), fuels the tensions within the Washington Consensus⁸ over the legitimacy or efficacy of globalization's policy apparatus (cf. Stiglitz, 2002), and leads UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan to encourage "globalization with a human face."

In short, this chapter's specification of globalization as corporate power highlights the process by which its contradictory relationships form it as an ongoing discursive project of market rule. From this perspective, globalization is a formative (and thereby unresolved) process. Although analysis may not resolve the question of what globalization is, it can usefully situate this question diachronically and synchronically. Diachronic analysis considers globalizations *contextual* (historical) dimensions, whereas synchronic analysis considers its *compositional* di-

mensions. Both aspects lend themselves to incorporated comparison,⁹ which views forms of globalization as successively related instances of an historic world ordering in the modern epoch (see note 4), and interprets corporate globalization as a product of its contradictory political relations — in particular the historical dialectic of sovereignty and rights.

MODERNITY, RIGHTS, AND SOVEREIGNTY

As perhaps the touchstone of modernity, sovereignty is institutionalized in the process of nation-state formation and the construction of citizenship rights. The rise of the modern state is premised on the emergence of civil society, the realm of private property and individual rights. How individual rights are translated into citizenship rights (and vice versa) and what those rights entail depend on the transformation of property relations and state trajectories. The classic formulation of this evolutionary modernist view of citizenship was that of T. H. Marshall (1964).

Marshall defined citizenship as comprehensive membership in the national community — a historical resolution of the tensions between political equality in the state and economic inequality in the marketplace. As the political expression of the development of civil society, citizenship derives from a process of formalizing substantive rights in the state, from political, through economic, to social rights. Political rights (as limited as they were to propertyholders in the state) provided the precondition for economic rights (arising from labor organization), which enabled the institutionalization of social rights in the twentieth-century

⁸ The Washington Consensus refers to that collection of neoliberal economic policies (trade and financial liberalization, privatization, and macrostability of the world economy) uniting multilateral institutions, representatives of the international arm of the U.S. state, and associated G-7 countries enabling corporate globalization and, arguably, U.S. hegemony.

⁹ Incorporated comparison is geared to dereifying the social world as a relational process rather than a set of categorical constructs; collapsing the externalist categorization of social entities as discrete, independent cases to be compared; and collapsing metaphorical binaries like global/local (McMichael, 1990). The comparative juxtaposition of relational parts (such as rules and resistances) progressively constitutes a whole, as a formative construct: here, a world-historical conjuncture, the "globalization project."

welfare state (cf. Stephens, Rueschemeyer, and Stephens, 1992).¹⁰

This interpretation of citizenship as the social democratic achievement informed much of the post-World War II political sociology literature and its search for a progressive model in the shadow of totalitarian regimes (cf. Polanyi, 1957; Bendix, 1964; Moore, 1965). The key shortcoming of this interpretation was its state-centered understanding of political outcomes, discounting imperial relations and their recursive impact on Western states and citizens (Cooper and Stoler, 1997). Remarking on the "institutionalized racism" in states in the post-colonial era, Bryan Turner notes that the rise of citizenship was intimately associated with nationalism, where citizenship involved "(1) an inclusionary criterion for the allocation of entitlements, and (2) an exclusionary basis for building solidarity and creating identity" (2000:135, 137), discriminating against traditional peripheral cultures in Europe (cf. Hechter, 1975) and reproducing this inclusionary/exclusionary relation in colonial states.

Corporate globalization clarifies the world-historical and exclusionary dimensions of citizenship as it erodes social entitlements and redistributes people across national boundaries, complicating the question of sovereignty and citizenship. As David Held remarks: "there is a fundamental question about whether the rights embodied in citizenship rights can any longer be sustained simply within the framework that brought them into being" (1995:223). New conceptions of citizenship have emerged: from cosmopolitan citizenship (Held, 1995) through mobility citizenship (Urry, 2000) to global citizenship (Muetzelfeldt and Smith, 2002), and in the notion of the "multilayered citizen," where people's rights and obligations to a specific state are mediated and largely dependent on their membership of a specific ethnic, racial, reli-

gious or regional collectivity, although they are rarely completely contained by it" (Yuval-Davis, 2000:171).

Marshall's legalistic conception of rights obscures the participatory dimension of citizenship, rooted in civil society discourses of rights and obligations (see Janoski, 1998:17). These discourses inform the principle of autonomy (structured self-determination) that underpins the democratic project - whether in nation-states or in cosmopolitan political arrangements (Held, 1995:147).

gious or regional collectivity, although they are rarely completely contained by it" (Yuval-Davis, 2000:171).

The concept of global citizenship invokes the possibility of a global civil society (cf. Cox, 1999), and whether (and in what sense) movements aimed at containing global market rule are today reproducing the Polanyian protective impulse to secure social rights (cf. Bienefeld, 1989; Bernard, 1997). Polanyi offers a world-historical understanding of the derivation of rights: through the differential "discovery of society" across Western states embedded within a world market managed by international financiers. Polanyi's account of the challenge to the market ideology of economic liberalism remains state-centered. It is framed by the contemporary belief in the instrumentality of the nation-state as the vehicle of social protections. In his (modernist) account, the question of rights is overdetermined by the question of state sovereignty.

Corporate globalization generates the circumstances in which the modern form of sovereignty, although still relevant to counter-movement politics, is challenged by alternative forms of sovereignty, referred to variously as "globalization from below" (Brecher et al., 2000), "the anticapitalist resistance," "global social justice movements," or "democratic globalization." Many of these forms embrace, substantively, the idea of "subsidiarity," situating decision-making power at the lowest appropriate levels/loci, transforming sovereignty into a "relative rather than an absolute authority" (Brecher et al., 2000:44). Although it is impossible to detail the range of such movements, this chapter draws on the examples of the regional Mexican *Zapatista*, national Brazilian *Sem Terra*, and transnational *Via Campesina* movements to identify such alternative social forms practicing a politics of subsidiarity that is, significantly, cosmopolitan.

Explication of the tension between the conventional, Polanyian counter-movement (reasserting national sovereignty against neoliberalism) and the emergence of a decentralized transnational, "network movement" (Brecher et al., 2000; Hardt, 2002) suggests a crisis in the

paradigm of modernity. While there is a variety of reform and/or advocacy networks and nongovernmental organizations (from Amnesty International through Oxfam to Friends of the Earth), loosely defined as an emergent "global civil society" or an incipient organic "world parliament" (Monbiot, 2003), we consider here the discourse of three political movements, with active constituencies, that reformulate conceptions of sovereignty and rights reflexively — that is, in critical relation to *extant* global power relations. Social science conventions may view these as "peripheral" movements, but I regard this designation inappropriate in a global economy whose foundations rest firmly on a dialectic of exploitation/marginalization of the world's majority population. I focus on two features of modern sovereignty addressed by these movements: first, the limits of formal sovereignty, institutionalized in the liberal-modern binary of state/market (political/economic); and second, occlusion of imperial relations as the historic crucible of the modern state.

LIMITS OF THE PROJECT OF MODERNITY

We begin with an account of Polanyi's contribution, as it presages the politics of globalization. *The Great Transformation* (1957), constructed around the process of the "discovery of society," locates the question of rights in the social regulation of the market. Polanyi termed the commodification of land, labor, and money a fiction of economic ideology, because these social substances are not produced for sale — rather, they embody social relations. Their subjection to market relations is a political act. The fictitious nature of these commodities was revealed in the overwhelming social reaction to the rule of the market at the turn of the twentieth century. Landed classes mobilized against the pressures of commercial agriculture, workers organized against exploitation of their labor as a mere commodity whose price depended only on its supply and demand and whose employment depended on business fortunes beyond employee and employer control,

and whole societies struggled over the financial austerity imposed by the gold standard national economies experiencing trade imbalances. These various mobilizations formed a historic countermovement to the idea of the "self-regulating market."

Under sustained popular pressure, governments intervened in the market, abandoned the gold standard (the mother of all commodities) and the early-twentieth-century world resorted to socialism, fascism and New-Dealism. Out of these experiments, at the end of a period of world wars, the Cold War divided the industrial world between variants of social democracy (First World) and communism (Second World). While the former turned services like unemployment relief, health care, and education into public rights through a measure of decommodification and as a complement to market society, the latter abolished the separation of economics and politics through central planning, representing an "enormous political challenge to* the social form of the modern states-system" (Rosenberg, 2001:134).

For Polanyi, the movement of resistance to the ideology of the self-regulating market turned on a public vision of society, based in social protections, civil rights, and modern citizenship. That is, the countermovements revealed the social character of rights and equality in the state. But Polanyi's conception of the great transformation as the "discovery of society" betrays an essentialism of modernity, in a primordial social interest recovered through the double movement, obscuring the class, gender, ethnic, and imperial relations constituting the state. State-sanctioned citizenship may be a universal ideal, but its historic practice has been marked by relational strategies of alterity, privilege, and exclusion (Isin, 2002). Although the state is represented formally as the site of sovereignty (politics), its substantive dimensions include the class and cultural politics of the relations of power, production, and consumption.¹¹ That is, the

¹¹ The conventional understanding of the state as a one-sided and artificial "superstructure" of politics, distinguished from an equally artificial and depoliticized "base" of economics, stems from the

state itself is, in part, a relation of production (Saver, 1987) and reproduction (cf. Bakker and Gill 2003) and therefore part of the constitution of the thought and practice of civil society.

The modernity paradigm represents the state as the realm of political sovereignty, linked to civil society via national forms of citizenship, but historically states were constituted within imperial relations. That is, the substantive history of the state system is embedded in a complex of global and regional, class, racial, and ethnic power relations (cf. Wallerstein, 1974). The modern states discriminatory modes of rule contradict the rhetoric of European civility and modernity (see, e.g., Davis, 2000). Racism was integral to settler states, formed through genocidal relations with indigenous peoples, and colonial states — where, in Africa, exploitative apparatuses were often based in state patronage systems formed through artificial tribal hierarchies and land confiscation (Patel, 2002; Davidson, 1992:206, 257). With decolonization, independence formally abolished racial discrimination and affirmed civil freedoms, but it often divided power within the new nation-states according to the tribal relations (ethnic, religious, regional) established via colonial rule (Mamdani, 1996:17–20). Similarly, the states in the Indian subcontinent were constructed through the politics of partition in the moment of decolonization, at the same time as the state of Israel occupied and subdivided Palestine. Whereas the modernity paradigm proclaims formal equality in the state, assimilating minorities and deploying civil rights to correct historic inequities of access to the state and market,

surrounding exchange relations. Social relations among people appear as exchange relations between commodities, extinguishing the interdependence among people and elevating their dependence on "economy" (cf. Marx, 1967). The phenomenal independence of the economy is matched by the phenomena] independence of the realm of politics. Polanyi's critique of the commodity fetishism of economism as simply *unnatural* accepts the *fetishized* social form of the state, occluding its origins in the property relation, precluding an historical (and cultural) understanding of the phenomenon of market rule, and perhaps obscuring the inevitable return of what he referred to as "our obsolete market mentality" (1971).

most modern states embody historic tensions between formal secularism and historical layering of race, class, and ethnic political relations.

What is so distinctive about contemporary globalization is that it exacerbates these tensions through state transformation. Under the guise of formal sovereignty, states author the deregulation of financial flows and the privatization of public capacity, decomposing national political-economic coherence (Chossudovsky, 1997) and elevating ethnic and racial hierarchies within and across states. At the global level, historic north–south relations shape currency hierarchies and multilateral institutional power in such a way as to distribute the costs of structural adjustment to the weaker and more vulnerable states and populations (Cohen, 1998). Under the resulting austere conditions, states become the site and object of class, ethnic, and religious mobilizations based in regional or national politics. The insecurities and forced deprivations attending corporate globalization are expressed in myriad ways, from food riots through land occupation to indigenous and fundamentalist movements demanding rights in the state. These tensions express the historic inequalities within a global states system constituted through the uneven and incomplete project of postcolonial sovereignty and development, to which we now turn.

MODERNITY AND DEVELOPMENT

Development emerged as part of the modernity paradigm, as a political response to the deprivations of the market. Its centerpiece was the problem of dispossession and displacement of populations (both rural and industrial), through the consolidation of private property relations (in land or money–capital). As a result, "development" was reproduced on a broadening scale as governments sought to accommodate (and discipline) the expropriated to paid labor systems within industrial capitalist relations (Cowan and Shenton, 1996). This intervention informed, on a world scale, a discourse of international development in the mid-twentieth-century era of decolonization, targeting Third

World poverty (Escobar 1995), clearly enunciated by U.S. President Harry Truman on January 20, 1949:

"We must embark on a bold new program for making the benefits of our scientific advances and industrial progress available for the improvement and growth of underdeveloped areas. The old imperialism — exploitation for foreign profit — has no place in our plans. What we envisage is a program of development based on the concepts of democratic fair dealing" (quoted in Esteva, 1992:6).

The discourse of development, as a "fair deal," offered a vision of all societies moving along a path forged by the Western world — a path constituted by dispossession (cf. Davis, 2000). It was liberal insofar as it rejected colonialism and promoted self-determination, envisioning a national popular mobilization in the project of modernization and improvement of living standards. But it ignored the contribution of colonial peoples, cultures, and resources to European development; it forgot that the post-colonial states could not repeat the European experience of development through colonialism (other than through further dispossession of rural and minority peoples via internal colonialism); and it denied the intrinsic merit of non-European cultures.

As an ideal, the development paradigm erases the relation between the rise of modern citizenship in Europe and the horror of slavery and colonialism, and offers the world a single vision that flattens its diversity and sponsors an increasingly unsustainable monocultural industrial system. The development paradigm embodies a contradictory logic: It offers self-determination at the same time as it suspends self-definition (Rist, 1997:79). That is, it frames self-determination as a property of the nation-state: an imposed Western discipline (cf. Mitchell 1988). Here, "development" rehearses the duality of modernity, which at once celebrated the progressive Enlightenment principle of self-organization but contained it through the device of state sovereignty (Hardt and Negri, 2000:74). Political sovereignty was thus constructed as a relationship of power, channeling citizen and subject sovereignties

through the state. In short, modernity is expressed in the state form, as a *relation* with national and international dimensions.

In world-historical terms, citizenship, democracy, and development — all universal visions implying political, social, and economic rights — were forged, as attributes of states, within the colonial relationship and its disorganizing impact on the non-European world. The colonial relation conditioned these discourses, enabling their projection as universal conditions charting the future of the non-European world (cf. Cooper and Stoler, 1997:37). Together they informed the post-World War II "development project," a discursive vehicle for the ordering of world political-economy under U.S. hegemony (McMichael, 2004). The U.S. strategy, representing development as a historic entitlement of the community of (new) nations, was, as Immanuel Wallerstein (1995) put it, New Dealism writ large. Development was instituted as a regime of "embedded liberalism," premised on the deliberate organization of the world market around national economic priorities (Ruggie 1982). In other words, it was a globally instituted market, anchored in a now complete states system.

As the projection of the Anglo-American welfare state into the postcolonial states system, the development project combined aid with responsibility, especially adherence to the principle of the freedom of enterprise (Arrighi, 1994:68; Karagiannis, 2004). But the development project was an unrealizable ideal in an asymmetrical world order. Its four pillars combined national and international forms of regulation. First, it responded to, and sponsored, the completion of the nation-state system via decolonization and the institutionalization of the principle of self-determination in the United Nations.¹² Second, the 1944 Bretton Woods conference (creating the IMF and the

¹² This principle anticipated the post-Westphalian inclusion of individuals (rather than just states) as subjects of international law and codification of human rights. Held, noting the potential paradigm shift, suggests the logical conclusion of this vision is to challenge the whole principle that humankind should be organized as a society of sovereign states above all else" (1995:89)

World Bank) institutionalized the regulation of monetary relations on a world scale. Unlike the nineteenth century, when world money was produced through private financial houses, post-World War II world money was produced through a combination of the U.S. Federal Reserve (the U.S. controlled 70 percent of gold reserves) and an allied coalition of central banks (Arrighi, 1994:278), with an IMF/World Bank loan system designed to stabilize currency exchanges (aided by capital controls) and to incorporate postcolonial states into the development project. Third, national political-economies, with considerable variation, regulated wage relations with combinations of Keynesian macroeconomic policy and Fordist strategies to stabilize expanding production and consumption relations. Fourth, the Marshall Plan and other foreign aid programs driven by Cold War concerns infused the world economy with military, technological, and financial relations privileging U.S. corporate and geopolitical interests. These four pillars instituted a world market within an ideal discourse of development, in which states were responsible for managing national economic growth. Postcolonial states sought to transcend the structural dependency of the colonial division of labor by pursuing strategies of "import substitution industrialization" to build domestic manufacturing capacity, financed by continued patterns of exports of primary goods and/or by bilateral technical and food aid and multilateral loans.

The development project, as an attempt to universalize the model of the citizen state, remains unrealized. First, the nation-state was essentially a West European institution (cf. Davidson, 1992). It has had a troubled history in Eastern Europe and the postcolonial world, where state boundaries intersect cultural groupings and where the in-migration of ex-colonials has accelerated the erosion of civil rights associated with neoliberal reforms. Second, geopolitics has conferred privilege on some states at the expense of others. Industrialization of showcase, or strategic, states of the Cold War (e.g., South Korea, Taiwan, Chile, South Africa) served to confirm the development project while most of their erstwhile Third World partners have

been hard-pressed to replicate the First World development path (cf. Grosfoguel, 1996). And third, the institutional structure of the development project promoted transnational economic integration through aid programs and foreign investment. Freedom of enterprise encouraged transnational corporate activity and generated an offshore dollar market that ballooned in the 1970s with the recycling of petrodollars. A global money market arose, and, with rapid developments in information and communication technology, global banks gained prominence and an era of financialization ensued (Arrighi, 1994). Colin Leys (1996:7) captures the transition to the "globalization project":

By the mid-1980s the real world on which "development theory" had been premised had ... disappeared. Above all, national and international controls over capital movements had been removed, drastically curtailing the power of any state wishing to promote national development, while the international development community threw itself into the task of strengthening "market forces" (i.e., capital) at the expense of states everywhere, but especially in the Third World.

Ultimately, the globalization project represents an attempt to resolve the crisis of development, which appears as the crisis of state sovereignty. This crisis was immanent in the contradiction between the ideal of national development and transnational economic integration (cf. Friedmann and McMichael, 1989). The development project premise, that states were supposed to organize national economies, was undercut by the geopolitical and corporate relations ordering the "free world" as an international hierarchy of political and technological relations. Transnational firms deepened the "material integration of social reproduction across borders" (Rosenberg, 2001:134-5), compounding the differentials among Third World states as global production chains fragmented national economic sectors, preempting nationally driven forms of capital accumulation and wealth redistribution, and new forms of global finance exacerbated indebtedness among Third World states. These circumstances clarified the paradox of formal sovereignty: first, in the austere conditions imposed on overexposed Third

World states via the debt regime of the past two decades; and second, in the subsequent participation of governments in implementing market rule, via the institutions (WTO) and protocols (FTAs) of the globalization project.

GLOBALIZATION AND DEVELOPMENT:
RECYCLING THE DOUBLE MOVEMENT?

Arguably, globalization is the politics of instituting a corporate market on a global scale. There are two sides to this coin: the restructuring of states to facilitate global circuits of money and commodities (conventionally termed "opening economies"), and the construction of multilateral institutions and conventions securing this global "market rule." It involves a reconfiguration of priorities and power within states, typically expressed in the ascendance of globally oriented financial and trade interests over national developmentalist coalitions rooted in labor and peasant unions and institutionalized in urban welfare, education, and agricultural ministries (Canak, 1989). States are not disappearing; rather, they undergo transformation to accommodate global corporate relations and the requirements of sound finance, as interpreted by the multilateral agencies. Thus the condition for the Mexican state signing on to the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) was the sale or dissolution of 80 percent of its 1,555 public enterprises, the reduction of average tariffs on manufactured imports from 27 to 8 percent, wage reductions of up to 50 percent, a shift from husbanding a national agricultural and food sector to encouraging foreign investment in agro-exports, reducing rural credit and food subsidies, promoting food importing, and liberalizing access to the financial and transport sectors for foreign investors (McMichael, 2004:135, 192). In these ways and more, the transformation of the Mexican state facilitates the global deepening of relations of social reproduction. The paradox of sovereignty is exposed in the state's performance of its historic task of organizing the (now global) market.¹³

¹³ In observing that financialization has reduced the options of even powerful nation-states regarding eco-

Formal political sovereignty enables the enforcement of market rule. The management of the debt crisis by the Bretton Woods institutions illustrates this proposition. Bailouts of indebted states in the 1980s, and beyond, mandated government enactment of austerity measures under market-enabling conditions laid down by the IMF and World Bank crisis managers. Structural adjustment loans require combinations of currency devaluation, wage reductions, removal of social subsidies, privatization of the state, and liberalization of foreign trade and financial markets. Whereas these measures were implemented on a case-by-case basis in the 1980s, they were institutionalized in the 1990s as universal rules applying to a collective sovereignty, although not without some (continuing) resistance (Chossudovsky, 1997; McMichael, 2000a).

With the collapse of the Cold War in 1991, the stage was set for a universal application of liberalization, under the leadership of the United States and its G-7 allies. In the GATT Uruguay Round (1986-94), plans were afoot for extending trade liberalization measures from manufacturers to agriculture, services, and intellectual property. A powerful complex of transnational firms, including GM, IBM, and American Express, formed a multinational trade negotiations coalition to lobby GATT member nations (*New York Times*, November 11, 1990). The outcome of the Round was the creation of the World Trade Organization (WTO) with over 130 member states. Unlike the GATT, a trade treaty only, the WTO has the power, through its dispute settlement body, to enforce its rulings onto member states. Should states refuse to comply, the WTO can authorize the plaintiff to take unilateral action. The ambit of the dispute settlement mechanism is wide: covering trade, investment, services, and intellectual property.

conomic policy instruments, Held accentuates the ambiguity of sovereignty: "While this alone does not amount to a direct erosion of an individual state's entitlement to rule its roost — sovereignty — it leaves nation-states exposed and vulnerable to the networks of economic forces and relations which range in and through them, reconstituting their very form and capacities" (1995:134).

Member states can lodge complaints against rates deemed in restraint of trade with the WTO, whose ruling holds automatically unless every other member state votes to reverse it.

Consistent with the moderns conception of political sovereignty, the role of the WTO is ostensibly to enforce market freedoms, by depoliticizing the global economy. This implies a *general* challenge to national laws and regulations regarding the environment, health, preferential trade relations, social subsidies, labor legislation, and so on. Although the challenge does not eliminate all laws, it seeks to harmonize regulation across the state system and to lower the ceiling on democratic initiatives within the national polity, especially those involving sub-national jurisdictions (Tabb, 2000:9). That is, instituting a self-regulating market on a global scale reformulates and redistributes, rather than removes, sovereignty, simultaneously generating resistances.

The current challenge to national laws — and currencies — invokes a second cycle of Polanyian countermovements in a rediscovery of society. But instead of a historic *movement*, the *discovery* of society now appears to have been a historic *moment* rooted in the political history of the West. This was the moment of consolidation of the nation-state. The maturing of social rights (and, therefore, of social protections) was conditioned by the maturing of movements for decolonization - ignored by Polanyi, but, arguably, just as significant in the process of completion of the nation-state system. The significance of this conjuncture lay not only in the proliferation of new nations (and the creation of the United Nations), but also in the possibility of a sovereignty crisis, contained in the terms of the development project. Here, while the post-colonial world of the UN enshrines the individual sovereignty of states, the institutionalization of a global states system occurs in a world structured by an international division of labor and a hegemonic order premised on integration via corporate, military, and financial relations.

The crisis of sovereignty is revealed through Justin Rosenberg's concept of the "empire of civil society" (the formal duality of public and Private political realms *across* the modern states

system). He suggests that the public/private disjuncture "explains part of the paradox of sovereignty: why it is both more absolute in its 'purely political' prerogatives than other historical forms of rule, and yet highly ambiguous as a measure of actual power" (Rosenberg, 2001:131). Thus, the moment of consolidation of national sovereignty as a universal form via the development project simultaneously spawned a powerful counterpoint in the state-sponsored corporate integration of economic relations on a world scale. It is this dialectic that sparks debates about the fate of the state under globalization and underlies current tensions within the WTO, as the agency now responsible for instituting the self-regulating market. And it is this tension that reveals the crisis of sovereignty.

The crisis of sovereignty is expressed formally in declining state capacity to protect (all) citizens as well as in the substantive challenge by countermovements to modern understandings of sovereignty, both spurred by corporate globalization. As Charles Tilly (1984) suggests, historically capital inherited the state as a protection racket, subordinating peoples and cultures across the world to territorial administration and refashioning the state via civic representation as a legitimizing and/or empowering relation with its subjects. Arguably capital now owns or seeks to own the state, via privatization and the disciplines of deregulated monetary relations, and has a diminishing need for substantive forms of democracy associated with the twentieth-century "discovery of society" (cf. Hardt and Negri, 2000). In the twenty-first century, the citizen state is "de/reregulated" as a market state in the service of global capital circuits, unleashing a protective movement that is compelled to rethink the meaning of civil society and social rights. That is, the significance of corporate globalization lies in the trajectory of the state and the related question of rights.

GLOBALIZATION AND ITS COUNTERMOVEMENTS

In this era of globalization, we find a curious tension embedded in the discourse of universal

rights. Globalization, as a discursive corporate project, portrays the world's future in singular, universalist, and abstracted terms - as moving toward a market culture enabled by Western science and technology and promoting expanding freedoms of capacity and choice. This is a particular vision of the world, presented as a universal. However, after fifty years of development, only 20 percent of the 'world's population has the cash or access to consumer credit to participate in this market, and the remaining 80 percent do not all necessarily aspire to Western consumerism (Barnet and Cavanagh, 1994:383). In fact, we find a proliferation of social movements proclaiming the universal right to be different.

Instead of a politics of participation in the centralizing marketplace of development, counter-movements pose alternative, decentralized conceptions of politics governed by locality (place, network, diaspora) and/or situated identity (where relations of class, gender, race, ethnicity, and environmental stewardship are specified world-historically). This is not a wholesale rejection of modern relationships (technical, financial, landed) so much as a reformulation of the terms and meanings of these relationships. The counter-movements may seek to subsume market relations to their particular politics, but, "post-Polanyi," these alternative forms of sovereignty are governed not by the universals of the states system but by the particulars of locality/identity-based relations (which may inform global network organizations, such as Fairtrade Labelling Organizations International and *Via Campesina*). Although this politics is distinguished as locality/identity-oriented politics, it is not *postmodern* in the sense of eschewing a material politics. It is a politics born of modern world-historical circumstances, of corporate globalization: It is only at the point at which national sovereignty is *universally* called into question that the artificial separation of politics from economics is fully revealed, encouraging alternative conceptions of political-economic sovereignty.

The unclenching of the "empire of civil society," so to speak, is precisely the moment of transition between the development project and the globalization project, as the sovereignty

of the nation-state yields to the sovereignty of monetary relations.¹⁴ This transition was effected by two, related, world events. First, the 1970s deregulation of financial relations subordinated all currencies and, therefore, states, to the rationality of global money markets.¹⁵ The second transitional event was the puncturing of the "developmentalist illusion" (Arrighi, 1990) by the 1980s debt regime, preparing the ground for the project of globalization. The devastating devaluation of southern economies and societies, imposed by the multilateral agencies on behalf of finance capital, exposed the growing autonomy of global economic relations and the structural and institutionalized *necessity* of state sponsorship of these relations.¹⁶

The potential erosion of individual national sovereignties was formalized in 1995 in the establishment of the WTO. In redefining development as a global corporate project, the WTO *collectivizes* the sovereignty of its member states as a general vehicle of market rule (McMichael, 2000a). Joseph Stiglitz confirms this in distinguishing the WTO from the Bretton Woods institutions thus: "It does not set rules *itself*; rather it provides a forum in which trade negotiations go on and it ensures that its agreements are lived up to" (2002:16). The reconfiguration of sovereignty involves abstraction: Just as the global economy reduces production sites across the world to competitive replicates of one

¹⁴ For an extended discussion of this, see Arrighi, 1998 and McMichael, 2000b. In this sense, Polanyi's claim that "the currency is the nation" was prescient.

¹⁵ Thus: "When interest and currency rates are no longer determined politically by legitimate institutions of the nation-state but rather are formed by global markets, the market dynamic can no longer be politically regulated according to directives which are incompatible with it... Politics does not disappear, but its rationality is synchronized with the economy" (Altwater and Mahnkopf, 1997:463).

¹⁶ As Jeffrey Sachs observed of IMF management: "Not unlike the days when the British Empire placed senior officials directly into the Egyptian and Ottoman finance ministries, the IMF is insinuated into the inner sanctums of nearly 75 developing-country governments around the world... (which) rarely move without consulting the IMF staff, and when they do, they risk their lifelines to capital markets, foreign aid, and international respectability" (1998:17).

another, so state organizations surrender their particularity to the competitive relations of the global money market.

In this recomposition of sovereignty, the corporate empire reveals that the economic is political (and vice versa), spawning counter-movements no longer captured by the abstractions of modernity, development, state, and economy. The global counter-movement, in resisting privatization and the conversion of social life into the commodity form, reformulates the political terrain in which reembedding of the market can occur, producing a radical redefinition of political economy. This is not just about infusing a moral economy into an existing political economy of nation states, which, under mid-twentieth-century circumstances became the Polanyian *realpolitik*, for better or for worse (cf. Lacher, 1999). It is about reformulating conceptions of civil/human rights, the state, and development (cf. Mohan, 2004).

PROPERTY RIGHTS VERSUS THE COMMONS

When welfare systems and other public services are privatized, the meaning of citizenship switches from membership of the public household with rights to social protections, to membership of the market with rights to produce, exchange, and consume. Citizens are regarded increasingly as "bearers of economic rationality" (Drainville, 1995:60), and access to goods and services (some of which were once public) is determined less by need and more by merit. As states restructure, rights to public goods dwindle, replaced by uneven access to the market. Neoliberal policies accentuate the individual (as opposed to the civic) content of citizenship, subordinating social rights to economic rights, which enables corporate claims on the state: "an aggregation of economic rights . . . constitutes a form of economic citizenship, in that it empowers and can demand accountability from government." Thus investors rather than citizens "vote governments' economic policies down or in; they can force governments to take certain measures and not others" (Sassen, 1996:39).

The aggregation of economic rights is not so defining of this form of globalization as the attempt to *institutionalize* property rights on a global scale. Sheer size or scale may distinguish the twenty-first-century corporation, but the privileging of corporate rights over citizens' rights via institutional transformations is more profound. Nowhere is this more dramatic than in the participation of states in the elaboration of global market rule. Citizens understand this threat — from the 146 IMF food riots in thirty nine countries, protesting the austerity policies of the debt regime as social rights to food subsidies shrunk (Walton and Seddon, 1994), through broad civic protest over privatization schemes to the exploration of alternative local forms of government (e.g., Argentina's neighborhood assemblies).

The successful resistance to the attempt to privatize Cochabamba's water system was a turning point for popular mobilizations in Bolivia, formerly touted by the multilateral agencies as a model for other low-income countries (Farthing and Kohl, 2001:9). The corporate consortium that purchased the city's water doubled prices and charged citizens for rainwater collected on rooftops. Poor families found food was now cheaper than water. The depth of public outcry forced the city to resume control of the water system. Citizen action thus de-commodified a public good. However, if the WTO's proposed General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS 2000) had been in place, such a reversal would have been practically impossible. GATS, described by the WTO as "the world's first international investment agreement," targets the privatization of basic services such as health care, education, and water supply; infrastructures such as post, public transport, and communications; cultural services such as broadcasting, films, libraries, and museums; as well as finance and tourism. Whereas GATS may exclude services provided "under the exercise of government authority," it does apply if services have a commercial dimension or compete with the private sector, and, because governments can liberalize more, but not less, under GATS, an *expansion* of regulation or public assets is ruled out (Coates, 2001:28).

Privatizing public goods is also enabled by the intellectual property rights protocol in the WTO, known as Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs). As a relational feature of corporate globalization, it is premised on the elimination, or incorporation, of the commons and at the same time crystallizes resistance around the protection of indigenous knowledges and practices. The intellectual property rights regime originated in stemming piracy of Western products such as CDs, watches, and so forth in the global south, but it now sanctions a reverse biopiracy on a disproportionate scale, threatening cultural rather than simply commodity rights. Patenting microbiological organisms, via TRIPs, protects monopoly rights to seeds, plants, and plant products where they have been genetically modified. By appropriating plant varieties developed over centuries, TRIPs' protection of Western scientific innovation invisibilizes alternative sciences of indigenous agriculture and biodiversity management (Shiva, 1997:8).

Within the WTO, the TRIPs protocol privileges governments and corporations as legal entities and disempowers communities and farmers whose rights to plant their crops are subject to claims of patent infringement. One model of resistance emerged in 1996 in the Indian village of Pattuvam in the southern state of Kerala, when it declared its ownership over all genetic resources within its jurisdiction (Alvares, 1997). This preemption of corporate genetic prospecting is protected by the Indian constitution, which decentralizes certain powers to village-level institutions. By registering local plant species and cultivars in local names, the village claimed collective ownership of genetic resources, denying the possibility of corporate patents applying to these resources and removing the property from intellectual rights.¹⁷ As Shiva observes: "The seed is, for the farmer, not merely the source of future plants and food; it is the storage place of culture and history" (1997:8).

The Pattuvam resistance exemplifies the significance of place in countermovement poli-

tics against the spatial abstraction inherent in the commodity relation and the monoculture of modern scientific rationality. Vine Deloria Jr.'s claim that modernity's obsession with time (as money) contrasts with the place-based epistemology of nonmarket cultures (in Star 2000:189) echoes Marx's observation that the logic of commodity circulation is the destruction of space by time. Arguably, the global south offers a multiplicity of examples of place-based epistemology - whether ecologically and/or cosmologically driven peasant and indigenous cultures. Attempts to revalue local space through constructing alternative currency relations or community-supported agricultures, especially in the north, pursue a similar goal but within a different historical relationship to capitalist modernity (cf. Hines, 2000). By extension, transnational networks, such as environmental, fair trade, human rights, unions, and farmers' movements, address concerns rooted in localities that, together, unify their diversity. Counterposed to the uniform market culture of corporate globalization, resistance is heterogeneous in time and space and yet well aware of its world-historical context.

GLOBAL COUNTERMOVEMENT POLITICS

Corporate globalization generates a range of resistances, those highlighted here developing a counterhegemonic politics based in the right to live by values other than those of the market. Grassroots movements assert cultural diversity as a world-historical relation and human right, embodying what Sachs calls "cosmopolitan localism" (1992:112). The antimarket rule movement is most evident in the global south, where the tradition of the commons is more recent and/or where the empire has no clothes.

Revealing the nakedness of empire is decidedly postcolonial, in the sense that the crisis of development includes its (and the state's) demystification. As the *Zapatistas* commented, in resisting the Mexican state's embrace of NAFTA (1994):

"When we rose up against a national government, we found that it did not exist. In reality we were

¹⁷ This notion comes from Raj Patel.

against great financial capital, against speculation on investment, which makes all decisions in Mexico, well as in Europe, Asia, Africa, Oceania, the Americas — everywhere" (quoted in Starr, 2000:104).

Having confronted the paradox of state sovereignty, the *Zapatista* uprising significantly unsettled regional financial markets, contributing to a 20 percent devaluation of the peso at the end of 1994. Arguably, the *Zapatista* political intervention revealed the contingency of development (as registered by Mexico's 1994 admission into the OECD), implying that it was a confidence trick of the globalization project:

"At the end of 1994 the economic farce with which Salinas had deceived the Nation and the international economy exploded. The nation of money called the grand gentlemen of power and arrogance to dinner, and they did not hesitate in betraying the soil and sky in which they prospered with Mexican blood. The economic crisis awoke Mexicans from the sweet and stupifying dream of entry into the first world" (quoted in Starr, 2000:104).

The power of the *Zapatista* movement lies precisely in its ability to situate its political intervention in cosmopolitan, world-historical terms - relating its regional condition, through national, to global, relationships. This includes linking the Mexican state's participation in NAFTA, which Subcomandante Marcos declared to be "a death sentence for indigenous people," to the historic colonization of Chiapas; and linking *Zapatismo* to resistance movements across the world: "we are the possibility that (empire) can be made to disappear . . . tell it (empire) you have alternatives to its world" (quoted in Starr, 2000:104-5).

The *Zapatista* uprising, timed to coincide with the implementation of NAFTA, was revelatory rather than simply programmatic (Harvey, 1999:199). It linked a powerful and symbolic critique of the politics of globalization with the demand for civil rights linked to regional autonomy. When the Mexican government tried appeasement through a National Commission for Integral Development and Social Justice for Indigenous People and injecting funds into Chiapas, the *Zapatistas* rejected this as "just another step in their cultural assimilation and economic

annihilation" (Cleaver, 1994:50). *Zapatismo* asserted a politics of rights going beyond individual or property rights to human and community rights, resonating with indigenous rights movements elsewhere. As Neil Harvey observes: "If citizenship in Salinas' Mexico was contingent on the economic competitiveness of each individual, the indigenous had little hope of surviving either as citizens or as peoples" (1999:200). That is, *Zapatista* politics are not about inclusion per se, but about redefining citizenship, calling for: "A political dynamic not interested in taking political power but in building a democracy where those who govern, govern by obeying" (quoted in Harvey, 1999:210).

The durability of the *Zapatista* resistance stems from a lengthy process, undertaken by Marcos and a small cadre band, of blending the *Zapatista* critique of Mexican political history with the "indigenous peoples' story of humiliation, exploitation and racism" (Harvey, 1999:166). It exemplifies a world-historical sensibility in bringing a cultural politics to the question of civil rights. The more substantive notion of collective rights grounds the civic project in place-based mobilization, based on "historical memory, cultural practices, and political symbols as much as on legal norms" (Harvey, 1999:28). As a regional movement against empire and its state form, the *Zapatistas* particularize a universal notion of rights in blending ethnic, gender, and class relations into a process, rather than a structure, of democracy.

The particularization of rights, in a self-organizing movement addressing and redressing tangible historical relations, is simultaneously a universal claim to substantive forms of democracy, which I am arguing is the root of the global countermovement. The conception of rights makes no prior claim to content, as movements and communities reserve the right to define for themselves appropriate political and ecological relations. Some movements consciously invert the problematic of capitalist modernity, understood here as a European universal legitimizing global empire. Contemporary indigenous movements, from the Ecuadorian movement (CONAIE) to the North American Inuit, affirm citizenship as a basic national and human right

but view it as the vehicle for respecting the differential rights of minorities, creating plurinational states with varying degrees of autonomy. Within the *Zapatista* movement, women have questioned the premise of official indigenous state policies that dichotomizes modernity and tradition, insisting on "the right to hold to distinct cultural traditions while at the same time changing aspects of those traditions that oppress or exclude them" (Eber, 1999:16). This involves blending the formal demand for territorial and resource autonomy with the substantive demand for women's rights to political, physical, economic, social, and cultural autonomy.

Another compelling social experiment crystallizing in the crucible of neoliberalism is the Brazilian landless workers' movement, the *Movimento dos Trabalhadores Rurais Sem Terra* (MST). The Cardoso governments neoliberal experiment (1995–2002) subordinated Brazilian political economy to global financial capital in a late-twentieth-century context where 1 percent of landowners own (but do not necessarily cultivate) almost 50 percent of the land, while 4.8 million families are landless. Between 1970–85, agricultural subsidies cost Brazil US \$31 billion. Since 1985 they have disappeared, even as OECD member states' agricultural subsidies continue at US \$360 billion a year. As the MST Web site claims: "From 1985 to 1996, according to the agrarian census, 942,000 farms disappeared, 96% of which were smaller than one hundred hectares. From that total, 400 thousand establishments went bankrupt in the first two years of the Cardoso government, 1995–96." Between 1985–96 rural unemployment rose by 5.5 million, and between 1995–9 a rural exodus of 4 million Brazilians occurred. While in the 1980s Brazil imported roughly US \$1 million worth of wheat, apples, and products not produced in Brazil, from "1995 to 1999, this annual average leapt to 6.8 billion dollars, with the importation of many products cultivable ... in Brazil" (www.mstbrazil.org/EconomicModel.html).

Since the mid-1980s, the MST has settled 400,000 families on more than 15 million acres of land seized by takeovers in Brazil. The MST draws legitimacy from the 1988 Brazilian consti-

tution's sanction of the confiscation of uncultivated private property, not performing its social function. The method of direct occupation, met with state military and legal force, has exposed the inequality of landed relations and the complicity of the state in the centuries-old Brazilian system of landed rule. National polls confirm popular support of seizure of unproductive land and government administrators have recognized that the cost of maintaining the same people in urban favelas is twelve times the cost of legalizing land occupation (*Food First*, Winter 2001). The priority given to producing staple foods for low-income consumers (rather than foods for affluent consumers in cities and abroad) led to an agreement with the da Silva government, for direct purchase of settlement produce for the national Zero Hunger campaign (Jardim, 2003).

The power of the movement resides not only in its practice of securing landed "spaces of hope," but also in its sponsorship of demonstrations, marches, occupation of government buildings, and negotiations through which it has managed to seize strategic moments in national politics. The MST pursues a program called "Project Brazil," using alliance-building to develop a national alternative to the global corporate project. In articulating its agrarian struggle with urban-based struggles (such as the Movement of Homeless Workers and various favela organizations), the MST draws on several themes in Brazilian political history: liberation theology and Marxism, the "new unionism" of urban social movements of the basic church communities, and the Peasant Leagues. Through an initial alliance with the church, "the only body that had what you might call a capillary organization across the whole country" (Stedile, 2002:79), and its Pastoral Commission on Land (1975), the MST developed a national, but decentralized, organization spanning twenty-seven states (concentrated among descendants of European immigrants in the south and mestizos in the northeast). Dispossessed farmers comprise the majority of its membership, but in the more urban south in particular the MST includes unemployed workers and disillusioned civil servants. Originally autonomous of the Worker's Party (PT), the MST has supported it electorally and

developed closer ties. Following the PT's recent success in the presidential elections, President da Silva created a new Ministry for Economic Solidarity, headed by an ex-seminary student active in liberation theology and in the founding of the MST and supportive of its agrarian agenda. The formation of cooperatives (sixty by 2003) follows land seizures (large-scale for security). The MST Settlers Cooperative System differs from traditional cooperatives through social mobilization "transforming the economic struggle into a political and ideological struggle." Over and beyond the (often unforgiving) task of settling hundreds of thousands of families on recovered land, the political-economic novelty of this movement lies in "linking up what it calls the struggle for the land with the struggle on the land" (Flavio de Almeida and Sanchez, 2000). The model of social appropriation includes democratic decision making to develop cooperative relations among workers and alternative land use patterns, and participatory budgeting, financed by socializing some settlement income (Dias Martins, 2000). The social project of the MST connects production and pedagogy, informing its work and study method of education.¹⁸

The MST's 1,600 government-recognized settlements include medical clinics and training centers for health care workers; 1,200 public schools employing an estimated 3,800 teachers serving about 150,000 children at any one time. A UNESCO grant enables adult literacy classes for 25,000, and the MST sponsors technical classes and teacher training. Cooperative enterprises produce jobs for thousands of members, in addition to foodstuffs and clothing for local and national (nonaffluent) consumption.

João Pedro Stedile, president of the MST, observes: Under the objective economic conditions, our proposal for land reform has to avoid the oversimplification of classical capitalist land reform, which merely divides up large landholdings and encourages their productive use. We are convinced that nowadays it is necessary to reorganize agriculture on a different social base, democratize access to capital, democratize the agroindustrial process (something just as important as landownership), and democratize access to know-how, that is, to formal education" (Orlando Pinassi et al., 2000).

Although more recently the MST has linked its prospects to the success of the PT, it continues a regenerative political culture based in agroecology, continuous learning, and community self-reliance. In a transitional moment such as this, global justice movements reach beyond the nation-state to more complex, and uncertain, ideas of sovereignty, even as they position themselves as transformative movements within the states system.

MST politics exemplify the mushrooming movement across the world for "food sovereignty": a material and discursive counterpoint to the concept of "food security," linked in the 1980s to global agro-industries and breadbaskets supplying food through "free trade."¹⁹ Food sovereignty insists on cultural and ecological integrity, and food quality, counterposed to the agro-industrial fetish of quantity, which has produced "scarcity in abundance," expressed in the marginalization of local farming on a world scale (Araghi, 2000). Marginalization is a by-product of the corporate pursuit, via WTO rules, of comparative advantages via farm sector liberalization. This involves exploiting north/south asymmetries, where the average subsidy to U.S. farmers and grain traders is about a hundred times the income of a corn farmer in Mindanao (Watkins, 1996). Conservative estimates are that between 20 million and 30 million people have recently lost their land due to the impact of trade liberalization (Madeley, 2000:75). Global food insecurity stems from the appropriation of land for the exports to affluent markets and by world market dumping of heavily subsidized but artificially cheap food by the grain-rich countries undermining peasant agricultures (McMichael, 2003).

¹⁹ The trade principle justifying this global reconfiguration of agriculture informed the 1995 WTO Agreement on Agriculture, enunciated by the U.S. delegation during the Uruguay Round: "The U.S. has always maintained that self-sufficiency and food security are not one and the same. Food security – the ability to acquire the food you need when you need it – is best provided through a smooth-functioning world market" (quoted in Ritchie, 1993:25).

The food sovereignty countermovement seeks to revitalize cultural, ecological, and democratic processes in protecting local farming. It anchors its political-economy in alternative, agro-ecological models producing substantially higher, more diverse, and more sustainable outputs of food than high-input industrial agriculture (Norberg-Hodge, Goering, and Page, 2001:61). The Charter of Farmers' Rights issued by the international Seed Satyagraha Movement for biodiversity asserts the rights to land; to conserve, reproduce, and modify seed and plant material; to feed and save the country from food insecurity; and to information and participatory research (Nayar, 2000:21). Expressing the global solidarities of this countermovement, MST National Committee member João Pedro Stedile claims:

"It's not enough to argue that if you work the land, you have proprietary rights over it. The Vietnamese and Indian farmers have contributed a lot to our debates on this. They have a different view of agriculture, and of nature — one that we've tried to synthesize in *Via Campesina*. We want an agrarian practice that transforms farmers into guardians of the land, and a different way of farming, that ensures an ecological equilibrium and also guarantees that land is not seen as private property" (2002:100).

The several-million-strong transnational movement, *Via Campesina* (the MST is one of its eighty-seven national members), asserts "Farmers Rights are eminently collective" and "should therefore be considered as a different legal framework from those of private property." Uniting landless peasants, family farmers, agricultural workers, rural women, and indigenous communities, *Via Campesina* claims that:

"biodiversity has as a fundamental base the recognition of human diversity, the acceptance that we are different and that every people and each individual has the freedom to think and to be. Seen in this way, biodiversity is not only flora, fauna, earth, water and ecosystems; it is also cultures, systems of production, human and economic relations, forms of government; in essence it is freedom." (<http://www.ns.rds.org.hn/via/>)

Via Campesina privileges food sovereignty over agricultural trade as the path to food security, noting that "the massive movement of food

around the world is forcing the increased movement of people." The precondition of food sovereignty, in this vision, is access to credit land, and fair prices to be set via rules negotiated in UNCTAD, not at the WTO. And, as a political alternative to the current corporate regime "the active participation of farmers' movements in defining agricultural and food policies within a democratic framework is indispensable." The specificity of these politics is that, while the consumer movement has discovered that "eating has become a political act," *Via Campesina* adds: "producing quality products for our own people has also become a political act. . . . this touches our very identities as citizens of this world" (<http://ns.rds.org.hn/via/>).

Via Campesina enriches the Polanyian sensibility for agrarian reform, declaring not only that it is "an instrument to eliminate poverty and social differences," but also that "peasants' access to land needs to be understood as a form of guarantee of the value of their culture, autonomy of community, and of a new vision of preservation of natural resources for humanity and future generations. Land is a good of nature that needs to be used for the welfare of all. Land is not, and cannot be, a marketable good." Instead of simply regulating land and food markets, this perspective embodies the alternative principles of autonomy, sovereignty, and political-ecology common to the global countermovement. The enactment of this principle in communities (e.g. across Africa)²⁰ or mass movements like the MST²¹ emerges most dramatically in the global

²⁰ Fantu Cheru documents the variety of "organized struggles for subsistence" in Africa, where "peasants now market their produce and livestock through their own channels, disregarding political boundaries and marketing boards," and self-organizing village development groups create physical and educational infrastructures, including cereal banks, grain mills and local pharmacies, concluding that "Locally based co-operative movements are the only ones that can realistically articulate an alternative vision of world order by creating new avenues of social and political mobilization" (1997:161-3).

²¹ Settlers do not automatically embrace the vision of the leadership (Caldeira, 2004). While movements are never single-minded, the reflexive goals of the global countermovement tend to consolidate the vision (Wright and Wolford, 2003).

in which where the complicity of the political in the corporate empire has the starkest consequences. The ecological principle stems from two sources: the critique largely from within northern, market societies of the social and environmental devastation from economic monocultures; and the critique largely from southern cultures that practice principles of biodiversity and agro-ecology, through custom and/or necessity. Insofar as the global counter-movements' common object is to resist corporate globalization and state sponsorship of commodity relations that threaten human communities and habitats, it includes the tactical goal of social protection. However, in addition to regulating market relations, counter-movements champion nonmarket polycultures and new forms of subsidiary political representation, asserting a new strategic right to diversity, in and across cultures.

CONCLUSION

As a discursive project of market rule, globalization enlists the instrumentality of the modern state in increasingly unaccountable policies with profound, crisis-ridden consequences for the politics of rights. This chapter argues that the crisis of sovereignty stems from three dimensions of corporate globalization: first, the erosion of citizenship rights in modern states via broad strategies of privatization and dismantling of social protections; second, the increasingly evident "citizenship gap" associated with, for example, more than 50 million political and economic refugees, displaced indigenous peoples, the 100 million unregistered domestic migrant workers in China, 1 million to 2 million modern-day slaves, and even subjects of southern countries in context of an exploding tourist industry (Brysk, 2002:3, 10-11); and third, the rising political claims for participatory alternatives within the global countermovement.

In delineating these three dimensions, I draw attention to the temporal layering of political responses to globalization. The immediacy of responses to current abuses of rights and human victimization ("globalization with

a human face") may be distinguished from the more visionary responses by movements to develop alternatives ("globalization from below"). The first set of responses includes the "struggle to promote the subaltern discourse on human rights," for example, to operationalize the "sleeping provisions" (Articles 25 and 28) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which link rights to the elimination of poverty and to humane governance of the social and international order. The 1990s saw several conferences on environment, women's rights, development, population, and human rights address these concerns, culminating in the UN Social Summit of 1995 (Falk, 2002:71). Because globalization is a power relation, we also find the multilateral agencies, the Davos economic forum, and their spokespeople proposing to reform the G-7's monopoly of financial power by imposing a "Tobin tax" on cross-border financial transactions and adopting the language of poverty alleviation and improving transparency in governance in an attempt to close the legitimacy gap (e.g., Stiglitz, 2002, Narayan, 2000). In other words, the double movement constitutes the politics of globalization.

As I have argued, the twenty-first-century double movement is different and links immediate protective goals with transitional, visionary practices exemplified in the mass movements of the global south. One such linkage is evident in postcolonial politics, where the "African Alternative Framework for Structural Adjustment Programs for Socio-Economic Recovery and Transformation," adopted by the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, critiqued the neoclassical assumptions of the development paradigm and offered a participatory model of collective development goals rooted in the specificity of African political cultures (Ake, 1996:36-8). Although these institutional responses are vulnerable to the G-7 development establishment's disproportionate financial and discursive power to appropriate its critics, nevertheless they register the participatory and cosmopolitan politics maturing across global communities in countless contexts, stimulated by the political deficits and social deprivations of corporate globalization.

Many of these contradictory circumstances stem from the crisis of development and its global extension via the neoliberal project, posing as a neutral market-driven solution. In this world-historical conjuncture, resistances reveal capitalist modernity as an imperial project, privileging corporate rights and depending on geopolitical and currency hierarchies. Contrary to the early-twentieth-century dress rehearsal for global development, today's countermovements reach beyond the formula of national market regulation and wealth redistribution to develop an alternative politics rooted in an ecological paradigm, rejecting modernity's separations of politics and economics, natural and social worlds, and rulers and ruled. Instead of the singular worldview associated with the modern state, this politics asserts the right to multiple worldviews regarding democratic organization and the securing of material well-being through cultural and environmental sustainability.

The specificity of corporate globalization is that in universalizing a particular vision on a diverse world, it crystallizes that diversity in increasingly reflexive resistance movements marked by a strategic solidarity. More than a global process of integration, globalization is a contradictory set of relations conditioning its politics, and recurring crises, with no necessary linear movement or outcome. The social experiments of the countermovements and the "cosmopolitan project" (Held, 2000), exemplified in the European Union, will continue in tension with a WTO increasingly hamstrung by the inherent disorder of an asymmetrical states system

(e.g., the conflict between the United States and the EU regarding GMOs, the intractability of the question of agricultural reform) and the global north's overbearing treatment of the global south. The collapse of the WTO Ministerial in Cancun (2003) revealed this power differential. A renewed solidarity within the global south (forming the Group of 21, led by Brazil, India, and China) and a parallel solidarity among global justice groups converged decisively to stall the meeting, exposing undemocratic WTO proceedings and unequal agricultural trade rules, GATS, and TRIPs protocols.

Although grassroots movements will by necessity develop their resistance, the short-term direction of the world order is complicated by the geopolitics of oil, U.S. unilateralism, and reactive terrorism (Achcar, 2002). In addition, the 1999 "global compact" (the "corporatization" of a financially strapped UN) and the politics of the 2002 UN resolution on weapons inspections in Iraq have deeply compromised the UN's ability to anchor an agenda of international law dedicated to advancing social and human rights reflecting multilateral rather than unilateral interests. For the foreseeable future, then, globalization and its analysis will be overdetermined by a resurgence of bilateralism and questions concerning the militarization of the corporate empire, the elevation of the rights of consumers-citizens in this new world disorder, and equations of resistance with terror — sharpening and clarifying the contradiction between this world and "another world" projected by the World Social Forum.